Right sizing for government review by Speirs, Andrew T. (Andrew Todd), 1975-
Right Sizing for Government Review
by
Andrew T. Speirs
B.S. Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering
Webb Institute of Naval Architecture, 1997
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
In Ocean Systems Management
At the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 1998
The author hereby grants MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author:
-epartment of Ocean Engineering
June, 1998
Certified by:
Henry S. Marcus
Thesis Advisor
NAVSEA Professor of Ship Acquisition
Accepted by: Accepted by: J. Kim Vandiver
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Studies
Department of Ocean EngineeringMASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
OCT 23 1998 Etl&
I Ir'Af Ice'
Right Sizing for Government Review
By
Andrew T. Speirs
Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering on May 8, 1998
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science
in Ocean Systems Management
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Navy has changed many of its acquisition practices. One of these
changes is from performing the early design work primarily in-house, to contracting
private shipyards to do the design. This change has shifted the government's role in
design to a predominantly review function. Therefore, the government needs to decide
what level of review should be performed, and how much this will cost in the future.
This research examines the Strategic Sealift acquisition program, which was one
of the first programs that employed this new acquisition strategy. The costs of the design
stages are identified, and the level of review is described. This research can be compared
to later programs, and possibly used as a benchmark for future programs.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry S. Marcus
Professor of Marine Systems
NAVSEA Professor of Ship Acquisition
Acknowledgements
First, I wish to thank Professor Henry S. Marcus, NAVSEA Professor of Ship
Acquisition, for all his help with this research.
I would also like to thank people in NAVSEA that gave me their time and
information. These include, but are not limited to, Ray Lisiewski, Jack Cameron, Corky
Fitzpatrick, Ron Nix, and Jim Sandison. In addition, I would like to thank Geoffrey
Fuller from Advanced Marine Enterprises. Much of the information in this thesis came
from these people; however, any mistakes are mine.
This thesis was supported by the NAVSEA Chair for the Professor of Ship
Acquisition.
Table of Contents
Right Sizing for Government Review.................................................................................................... 1
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Acknowledgements .................................................. 3
Table of Contents............................................ 4
Acronyms ................................................... 7
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 10
2 The Acquisition Process .................................................... 12
2.1 Historical Perspective of the Ship Acquisition Process ........................................ ...... .... 12
2.2 Acquisition Reform in the 1990s .................................................................... ............................. 15
2.2.1 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) ...................................... ..... .. 15
2.2.2 Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)
16
2.2.3 Reduction of Specifications and Standards................................................................. 16
2.2.4 Quality Function Deployment (QFD) ........................................................................ 17
2.3 The Current Generic Ship Acquisition Process ................................................................ 17
2.3.1 Pre-M ilestone 0..................................................................................................................... 17
2.3.2 M ilestone 0 ........................................................................................................................... 18
2.3.3 Phase 0........................................... ............................................................................... 19
2.3.4 M ilestone I ................................................... 20
2.3.5 Phase I .................................................. 20
2.3.6 M ilestone II................................................... 22
3 The Acquisition Players .............................................. 25
3.1 Government .................................................................................................................................. 26
3.1.1 Navy Program Office............................................................................................................ 26
3.1.2 Navy Design Office .............................................................................................................. 26
4
3.1.3 Other Government Agencies (OGA) ..................................................... 27
3.2 Private Industry Contractors ................................................................................................... 27
3.2.1 Design Agents............................................... 27
3.3.2 Other Contractors.................................................................................................................. 28
3.2.3 Shipyards .............................................................................................................................. 28
3.2.4 Research Labs .................................................... 28
3.2.5 Regulatory Bodies................................................................................................................. 29
4 A Case Study of the Sealift Program .................................................................................................... 30
4.1 History of the Sealift Program ................................................................................................ 30
4.2 Unique Features of the Sealift Program........................................................................................ 34
4.3 Development Costs of the Sealift Program................................................ 35
4.3.1 Concept and Feasibility Design Costs ....................................................... 46
4.3.2 Preliminary Design Costs ............................................................................................... 46
4.3.3 Contract Design Costs .................................................................................................... 51
5 Role of Government Review ................................................................................................................ 54
5.1 Function of Government Review.................................................................... ..... 54
5.2 Government Review in the Strategic Sealift Program ........................................ ......... 55
5.2.1 Design Reviews .................................................................................................................... 58
5.2.2 Design Review Notebooks.............................................................................................. 60
5.2.3 Specification Review Notebook ....................................................................... 70
5.2.4 Q&A's...................................................................... 70
5.2.5 COR Modifications............................................................................................................... 71
5.3 Effectiveness of Design Reviews............................................................................................ 71
5.4 Role of Government Review in Future Navy Ship Acquisition Programs ................................ 71
6 Acquisition Strategy Issues................................................................................................................... 73
6.1 Extent of Navy Involvement in the Early Design Stages.................................. .......... 73
6.2 Extent of Navy Involvement in Combat System Procurement and Integration ......................... 75
6.3 Competition versus Early Down-Selection............................................................................. 75
5
6.4 Role of Concurrent Engineering, IPPD, and IPTs in Navy Ship Acquisition ............................ 76
6.5 Most Effective Use of Acquisition Funding ...................................................................... 83
7 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 89
Selected References .................................................. 91
Acronyms
ABS American Bureau of Shipping
ADM Approval Decision Memorandum
AII Avondale Industries, Inc
AOA Analysis of Alternatives
APB Acquisition Program Baseline
ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy
CAIV Cost As an Independent Variable
CDRL Contract Data Requirements List
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COR Circular of Requirements
CSE Class Standard Equipment
DoD Department of Defense
DTRC David Taylor Research Center
FASA Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
FYDP Future Year Defense Plan
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
HM&E Hull, Machinery and Electrical
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
IPPD Integrated Product and Process Development
IPPDT Integrated Product and Process Development Team
IPT
JROC
MDA
MILSPEC
MNS
MS
NASSCO
NAVSEA
NDSF
NNS
OGA
OIPT
OPNAV
OR
ORD
PEO
PMS 385
QFD
ROM
RDT&E
RFP
SASC
SCN
Integrated Process Team
Joint Requirements Oversight Council
Milestone Decision Authority
Military Specification
Mission Need Statement
Milestone
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
Naval Sea Systems Command
National Defense Sealift Fund
Newport News Shipbuilding
Other Government Agencies
Overarching Integrated Product Team
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Operational Requirements
Operational Requirements Document
Program Executive Office
Strategic Sealift Program Office
Quality Function Deployment
Rough Order-of Magnitude
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Request for Proposal
Senate Armed Services Committee
Ship Construction Navy
8
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
SHAPM Ship Acquisition Project Manager
SUPSHIP Superintendent of Shipbuilding
TOR Tentative Operational Requirements
1 Introduction
The major shipyards in the United States are generally not competitive building
commercial ships on the world market. Many suggestions for change in both the design
and production processes have been offered by the maritime community. One common
criticism is that the U.S. military did not do the shipyards any favors by being their sole
customer. The shipyards became accustomed to designing and building ships the way the
military wanted it, and this may have contributed to their downfall in the world market.
The Navy is now beginning to change the way they acquire ships.
The world has changed greatly over the last few decades. With the fall of
communism in Eastern Europe, the major threats have shifted from the superpowers to
smaller countries. With these changes, the needs of the Navy have changed. In the
1980's, the U.S. was looking at building to a 600 ship Navy to prepare for the threats of
the large superpowers. Now the Navy is under increasing pressure from budget
reductions, and is looking to get more for its money. One movement within the
government is to buy commercial off-the-shelf products when they will fulfill the mission
need adequately. This movement has led to changes in the way the Navy acquires ships.
The main change in Navy acquisition has been the shift from in-house Navy designs,
towards industry performing the majority of the design work. In this new paradigm, the
government's role is shifting to a principally review function.
Many issues arise from these shifts in Navy acquisition. For instance, what is the
right amount of review to perform? How much should the government budget for ship
design in future programs? Would it make more sense to spend more money early in the
program, in the design stages, and save more money later due to reduced design changes
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or producibility enhancements? How will the latest trends in acquisition (such as
teaming arrangements, simulation-based design, etc.) change the costs associated with
ship design?
All of these factors will affect the cost attributed to ship design. This paper
investigates the design costs of the Strategic Sealift program as a basis for future
comparison to other acquisition programs.
2 The Acquisition Process'
The ship acquisition process in the Navy is always changing. Most of these changes
are small, but collectively these changes have altered the ship acquisition process
substantially. In order to understand the direction the Navy is headed in ship acquisition
strategy, it is important to understand the past.
2.1 Historical Perspective of the Ship Acquisition Process
The Navy has used several different ship acquisition strategies since World War
II. In the 1950s, the Navy designed its own ships with in-house resources exclusively.
This included naval shipyard personnel farmed-in for the process. The number of design
deliverables was few compared with the designs of today, and the design timeframe was
relatively short. The ship specifications were primarily engineering documents, as
opposed to legal ones. The ships were not as fully integrated for a couple of reasons.
First, different Navy organizations were responsible for the platform and weapons. In
addition, the Preliminary Design and Contract Design were separate organizations within
the Navy.
Construction in the 1950s occurred at both government (public) and contractor
(private) shipyards. Most of the contracts were awarded without competition. The
shipbuilders and the government did not have the same adversarial relationship that
existed in later years. Claims were rare, and there was a substantial commercial
Much of the content and wording of this section came from "Assessment of Options for Enhancing
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shipbuilding market in the U.S. relative to today. However, this process for awarding
major contracts on an allocation basis had some problems and could have utilized
taxpayer money more effectively by requiring competition.
In the 1960s, the Total Package Procurement initiative became the standard in the
Department of Defense (DoD). This concept included private shipbuilders designing the
ships instead of the Navy. Competing contractors were required to submit binding price
bids for the entire weapon-system program before contract award. This included the
development costs in addition to the production costs. This was intended to allow the
government a choice between competing products on the basis of commitments of
performance, delivery schedule, and the price of the operation equipment. This method
improved the system for generating requirements based on mission requirements. The
problem with this method was that most total-package awards resulted in huge cost
overruns. Once the shipbuilders began to lose money, large claims ensued and the
adversarial relationship started. The government had to provide large bailouts or
guaranteed loans to several of the contractors who faced bankruptcy. As a result,
Congress passed legislation prohibiting this procurement approach. In addition, during
this time the Navy stopped construction in government (public) shipyards.
In the 1970s a systems analysis and engineering approach was applied to all major
systems, including ships. This arose out of a desire for better attention to cost-
performance tradeoffs, and was called the Design to Cost initiative. The Navy re-
established its central design team and once again was mostly responsible for ship design.
The result of this systems approach was a large increase in design deliverables and design
Surface Ship Acquisition", March 1996, pages 37-43
time as well. Staffing shortfalls led to the increased use of civilian shipbuilders and ship
design agents for in-house Navy designs. The platform and weapons bureaus were
combined, and program managers/platform directors were established. This added a
layer between those who set the requirements, and those who design the ships.
In the 1980s, there were ample funds available for shipbuilding, as President
Reagan was advocating a buildup to a 600-ship Navy. With this increase in funding,
however, came a large concern regarding fraud, waste, abuse, competition and industrial
base. The high cost and alleged low quality of defense systems paralleled many other
industries in the U.S. One reason was that the defense industry had a customer who was
forced to buy what the shipbuilding industry produced. This loss of competition and
focus on Naval vessels led to the U.S. shipyards becoming highly uncompetitive on the
global commercial sector. As a result of these developments, many of the small-medium
sized shipyards went out of the business of building Naval ships; now there are six main
shipbuilders competing for the one major customer of ships in the U.S. (the Navy).
The development contracts for ships were fixed price, which meant that the
shipbuilders assumed more risk. In addition, dual sourcing for ships became
commonplace. One can debate whether this was beneficial from a cost saving strategy
point of view; however, it generally is accepted it was successful from an industrial base
standpoint.
In the 1990s the U.S. Navy has been adjusting to changes in the world order. A
reduction in the perceived threat of a major war has occurred with the breakup of the
Soviet Union. This has made a large impact on the Defense budget for the U.S. The
government is still struggling with what force level and type will be required in the
future.
2.2 Acquisition Reform in the 1990s
Acquisition reform in the 1990s has centered on two areas of effort. The first is to
use commercial products and processes in any application that does not require the
additional cost and performance of military specification material. The adoption of
commercial practices is made more difficult by the fact that the U.S. shipbuilders have
little commercial business, so there is no model in the U.S. to compare the government
business practices with. The second area of effort is to reduce non-value-added work,
particularly in oversight and review. The government has implemented several changes
to reflect these efforts.
2.2.1 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA)
This Act includes the following reforms:
* An increased dollar threshold (now $100,000) for using simplified small
purchase procedures.
* A performance-based incentive-based approach to managing acquisition
programs. DoD must approve cost, schedule, and performance goals for
each major program and assess whether or not the goals are being
achieved.
* Emphasis on streamlining the acquisition process and greater reliance on
commercial products and processes.
2.2.2 Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) and
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)
The Concurrent Engineering concept was an impetus for starting IPPD and IPT.
Concurrent Engineering is an effort to consider all aspects of the life cycle, especially
production, in the early stages of the design process. The IPPD concept extends this idea
by advocating that a good product requires a good process for designing, developing,
producing, and maintaining it. IPTs are the teams of personnel from different
backgrounds of design, manufacturing, and operation that participate in the process from
the beginning. In addition, there is an effort to incorporate the oversight and review
functions of the government into the IPTs. Rather than centering oversight on a finite set
of review meetings, staff in charge of oversight are part of the team from the beginning
and are continually updated. If an issue arises with the oversight team, it can be brought
up, and resolved immediately. The hope is that these concepts will lead to a more
producible design, with less rework involved, and ultimately reduce the cost of the ship.
2.2.3 Reduction of Specifications and Standards
The DoD has directed that military specifications and standards be used only
when required. This is an effort to use commercial standards when at all possible.
Performance specifications using commercial standards should be used to set
requirements.
2.2.4 Quality Function Deployment (QFD)
QFD is an effort to introduce the customer requirements into design requirements.
In general, the customer thinks more about the user's requirements than the design
engineers do.
2.3 The Current Generic Ship Acquisition Process2
The generic ship acquisition process is difficult to describe, as all of the programs
have some unusual features; however, the following describes the process on a high level.
The program structure is organized into phases and milestone decision points for a given
program. These phases and milestone decision points facilitate the translation of broad
mission needs into system-specific performance requirements and a design that fulfills
these requirements. The phases and milestones provide the framework within which a
system is designed, developed, and deployed during its life cycle. The program structure
is a fundamental building block of the program's acquisition strategy. At each milestone
decision point, the status of program execution and plans for the next phase and
remainder of the program should be assessed. The risks are addressed, in addition to the
adequacy of risk management planning.
2.3.1 Pre-Milestone 0
2 Defense Acquisition Deskbook, Sept. 30, 1997
In general, a program starts with a determination of mission need. This may be in
response to an aging class of vessels that need to be replaced, or an effort to incorporate
new technologies to our fleet to counter a new threat. These factors are reflected in the
Future-Year Defense Plan (FYDP), which indicates the fiscal year a new ship will be
procured. The first time the estimated cost for the procurement of a new ship will be
estimated is in the last two to four years of a FYDP. Depending upon which of the two
years this funding shows up, this allows for either a 4 or 5-year development cycle prior
to contract award. The funding amount shown in the FYDP is usually determined by
OPNAV and considers the type of ship to be procured, the previous cost of a similar type
of ship, and the available SCN money in that fiscal year. Another factor taken into
account is the mission characteristics and weapon system composition of the new ship.
This initial planning results in a Mission Need Statement (MNS) document for a new
ship, in addition to a threat assessment and an Acquisition Strategy Report. This
constitutes a Milestone 0 approval.
2.3.2 Milestone 0
Milestone 0 signifies the initial formal interface between the requirements
generation and the acquisition management systems. The Milestone Decision Authority
(MDA) decides what action should be taken on the Mission Need Statement (MNS) at
this decision point. For those MNS receiving favorable consideration, the MDA
authorizes studies of a set of alternative concepts. A decision to proceed at this point does
not establish a new acquisition program, but reflects approval to proceed with studies of
concepts to satisfy the identified mission need. These studies may be performed either by
in-house staff or contractors, or both.
The Milestone 0 Approval Decision Memorandum (ADM) approves the start of
Phase 0. In addition, the ADM should define the minimum set of alternative concepts to
be examined, identify lead organization for study efforts, identify the source of funding
for the studies, and determine the exit criteria. A Ship Acquisition Program Manager
(SHAPM) is either established, or designated to coordinate with the Navy Design Office
(03) to perform ship feasibility studies.
2.3.3 Phase 0
Phase 0 is concept exploration. Concept exploration generally includes feasibility
studies. These are competitive, parallel, short-term studies by the Government and/or
industry to define and evaluate the feasibility of alternative concepts. They also include
means for evaluating and ranking the relative merits of the concepts at Milestone I. Early
life cycle cost estimates should be performed for each of the competing alternatives, in
relation to the value of the expected increase in operational capability of each alternative.
This Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is intended to help compare alternative concepts.
The current scheme of acquisition results in tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and
performance as a result of a Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) analysis. The new
focus in Navy acquisition has shifted to a Total Cost of Ownership tradeoff. Some
tradeoffs include hull forms, HM&E, combat systems, manning projections, Integrated
Logistics Support (ILS) considerations, etc. The most promising concepts should be
defined in terms of initial objectives for life cycle cost, schedule, performance, and
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acquisition strategy. Critical system characteristics and operational constraints (e.g.,
survivability, interoperability, transportability, etc.), projected surge and mobilization
objectives, and infrastructure support requirements should be defined interactively with
users. Establishing detailed performance requirements and mandatory delivery dates is
avoided at this time, as premature detailed requirements are counter to evolutionary
requirements definition and inhibit cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs.
The acquisition strategy should provide for the validation of technologies and
processes required achieving critical characteristics and meeting operational constraints.
It should also address the need and rationale for concurrence and for prototyping,
considering the results of technology development and demonstration. Plans for the next
phase should also address risks. These studies usually take between 3 and 18 months to
complete, and are typically performed using in-house personnel with support from
contractors. The feasibility studies culminate in Milestone I review.
2.3.4 Milestone I
The MDA assesses the affordability of the proposed new acquisition program at
Milestone I. This is the decision point that marks the first direct interaction between the
planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition management systems. A favorable
decision at Milestone I establishes a new acquisition program. It also authorizes entry
into Phase I, preliminary and contract design for ships.
2.3.5 Phase I
Preliminary Design phase begins at Milestone I approval. OPNAV issues
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) which defines the options selected at the
Milestone I decision point. Preliminary design further refines the ship. Ship
characteristics, HM&E, and combat systems are finalized, while combat systems and
manning estimates are refined. Simultaneously, the SHAPM develops the programmatic
documents required to be completed during this phase of the acquisition. The Program
Office, Design Office, contractors and Navy laboratories are all usually involved in the
preliminary design phase. This phase usually takes between 6 and 12 months, and results
in the start of Contract Design.
Contract Design involves preparation of the ship contract specifications and
drawings, the contract statement of work, the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL)
and programmatic documentation. This phase usually lasts 9 to 15 months, and results in
Milestone II review. The Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued either before or after
Milestone II approval. After these steps happen, the government role generally shifts to
programmatic functions, rather than design-oriented ones. Source selection occurs after
Milestone II has been approved and the RFP has been issued. This step usually takes
between 6 and 12 months, and is scheduled to occur during the first quarter of the fiscal
year in which funding becomes available.
Multiple design approaches and parallel technologies are pursued within the
system concept during this phase, when warranted. Supportability and manufacturing
process design considerations should be integrated into the system design effort early.
This is essential to preclude costly redesign efforts downstream in the process.
Prototyping, testing, and early operational assessment of critical systems, subsystems,
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and components should be emphasized. This is essential to identifying and reducing risk,
and assessing if the most promising design approaches will operate in the intended
operational environment including both people and conditions. In fact, some people
believe we should be spending more funding in these areas, and receiving the rewards
later in the life cycle costs. There is a discussion of this later in the paper.
Cost drivers and alternatives are also identified and analyzed in this phase. In
addition, the cost of the design approach should be analyzed as a function of risk and the
expected increase in operational capability. The AOA should provide comparisons of the
alternative design approaches and should be the principal basis for establishing or
updating CAIV life cycle-based objectives.
Consistent with evolutionary requirements definition, the program manager works
with the user to establish proposed performance objectives, identify production rate
requirements for peacetime, contingency support, and reconstitution objectives, and
develop proposed cost-schedule-performance tradeoffs for decision at Milestone II.
2.3.6 Milestone II
The MDA should rigorously determine the affordability of the program and
establish a development Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) at this milestone. The
Defense Planning Guidance, long-range modernization and investment plans, and
internally generated planning documents of the DoD Components form the basis for
making this assessment. This is critical due to the amount of funding that is associated
with this decision. Establishing the development APB requires effective interaction
among the requirements generation, acquisition management, and planning,
programming, and budgeting systems.
Milestone II Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) approves entry into
Phase II (Engineering and Manufacturing Development). In addition, it approves the
proposed or modified APB and acquisition strategy, and establishes life cycle cost
objectives. Milestone II generally results in contract award.
Upon contract award, the emphasis of the program office shifts to contract
administration through SUPSHIP and engineering support from the Navy Design Office.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of ship acquisition on a high level. This figure
shows all the different relevant sub-processes, but no single sub-process is shown in
detail.
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3 The Acquisition Players
Figure 2 depicts the general players associated with Naval Ship Acquisition and
the mechanisms by which they generate costs. This does not include players who are
involved on the periphery, such as various review staff personnel, etc.
Navy Acquisition Overview
Process
P ers
Government Industry Contractors
- Navy Program Office - Design Agents
- Navy Design Office - Shipyards
- Navy Contracts Office - Research Labs
- Other Gov't Agencies - Regulatory Bodies
Figure 2.
The following sections will describe each of the players, and the role that each
plays in Navy Ship Acquisition.
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Government Industry
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3.1 Government
The government functions in Naval Ship Acquisition can generally be divided into
two groups; those who perform programmatic functions, and those who perform technical
functions.
3.1.1 Navy Program Office
The Navy Program Office is run by the Ship Acquisition Program Manager
(SHAPM). The SHAPM is responsible for developing an organization and planning to
efficiently acquire the appropriate number and type of ships to meet the Navy's
requirements. This management team, headed by a Program Manager, usually consists of
a business/financial manager, a logistics manager, a technical manager/system engineer, a
contracts officer, program engineers, and various specialists. This team is also
responsible for the development of the acquisition plan, which is the overall strategy to
attain an effective ship. The SHAPM is responsible for the planning, direction, control
and utilization of assigned program resources. It is the job of the SHAPM to provide
direction to the program support effort being performed by other organizations. They
prepare technical specifications, contracts, and much of the paperwork required to move
the program along. The funding for this Office up through Milestone II is through the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds.
3.1.2 Navy Design Office
The Navy Design Office performs the technical engineering work to support the
Program Office. The Program Office issues a ship's program directive, or task
instruction, to perform technical work to the Design Office. The money that the Design
Office spends to support the program is funded through the Program Office. In addition,
the Design Office may hire outside contractors, or Navy Laboratories to help with this
technical work. These contracts are funded through the Design Office.
3.1.3 Other Government Agencies (OGA)
The Design Office will often contract Other Government Agencies (OGA) to
perform some technical work, especially in the development stages. One example of an
OGA is David Taylor Research Center (DTRC), which often provides support of hull
development, model tests, etc. These agencies are tasked through a document called a
work request. The funds for these work requests also come through the Program Office.
3.2 Private Industry Contractors
Private Industry is involved throughout virtually all of the ship acquisition process.
There has been a movement in the government to have private industry do even more of
the work, with the government in primarily a review position.
3.2.1 Design Agents
Design Agents are involved throughout the design process. The government hires
private design agents to help with the feasibility, preliminary, and contract designs. In
addition, once shipyards become involved in the process, many hire private design agents
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to help with their design, all the way through detail design. One important distinction
exists: if a design agent is hired by the government for work on any part of the design,
that design agent is not allowed to support any shipyard in its design. This alleviates any
conflict of interest arising from one firm developing both the requirements and baseline
design for the government, and developing the design for the shipyard.
3.3.2 Other Contractors
For the purposes of this description of Navy ship acquisition, other contractors are
those companies in private industry that are not included in any of the other functions.
This is not a design company, shipyard, regulatory body, or research lab, but they provide
services to the government. An example of this would be a company that supports the
program management effort.
3.2.3 Shipyards
Shipyards receive the greatest percentage of the funds allotted for Navy
acquisition. They are involved starting in developing the design, all the way until the
ship has been accepted by the Navy and delivered. Traditionally, shipyards began to get
involved after the RFP was issued, and a contract was awarded. Recently, the shipyards
have started getting involved as early as exploratory design in pre-Milestone 0.
3.2.4 Research Labs
Research Labs perform some work for both the government and industry. Most
of this work involves hull development early in the design stages.
3.2.5 Regulatory Bodies
Historically, regulatory bodies have not been heavily involved in Naval Ship
Acquisition. Recently, however, there has been an effort to use commercial standard
more extensively, rather than developing the designs to military specifications and
standards.
4 A Case Study of the Sealift Program
The Sealift Program has been considered a successful Naval Acquisition Program
by most people familiar with the program. This program has used some practices
different from the norm of Naval Ship Acquisition.
4.1 History of the Sealift Program
The Strategic Sealift Program arose out of a need for suitable-size ships capable of
fast sealift logisitical missions. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) tasked
the Secretary of the Navy to prepare program plans for the development of this type of
ship in May 1988. The program was first funded in November 1989, when the FY90
defense appropriation bill approved $600 million in Ship Construction Navy (SCN) funds
for sealift. This was later reduced to $375 million due to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
action and a Milpers transfer. The FY90-91 defense appropriation bill also authorized the
Secretary of Defense to establish a fast Sealift ship program. In November 1990, the
FY91 defense appropriations bill funded $900 million of SCN funds for Sealift
acquisition, bringing the total SCN funds appropriated to $1.275 billion.
February of 1991 marked the date when SECNAV directed development of
operational requirements for large, medium-speed Ro/Ro ships and the beginning of
phased acquisition process. Later that month the CNO forwarded a draft of the Tentative
Operational Requirements (TOR) to NAVSEA and directed conduct of feasibility studies.
Two months following that, in April of 1991, NAVSEA forwarded Rough Order-of-
Magnitude (ROM) feasibility studies. These covered a range of new construction and
conversion alternatives.
The summer months of 1991 marked significant activity for the Sealift program. In
June the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) directed NAVSEA to commence
preparation of documents to support the acquisition process, including appropriate
streamlining measures. In July a draft of the Mission Need Statement was issued, and the
SECNAV approved the general concept of the program. On August 2, 1991 NAVSEA
issued an RFP for initial designs to U.S. shipyards. Later in August the Milestone 0 was
scheduled and suggested the use of this program as a major defense acquisition pilot
program. The Milestone 0 review was held August 30, 1991.
August 27, 1991, three days before Milestone 0 review, 9 U.S. shipyards responded
to the RFP for initial design. On September 11, 1991 concept design contracts were
awarded to these 9 shipyards. These contracts were worth $250,000 each. The initial
designs were received from the shipyards on December 11, 1991, three months after the
concept design contracts were awarded.
Meanwhile, in November 1991, the FY92 authorization bill specified that vessels
constructed under the program would incorporate propulsion systems, bridge and
machinery control systems, and interior communications equipment that are
manufactured in the United States. In January of 1992 the Defense Mobility
Requirements Study was completed, and it called for approximately 20 large medium-
speed Ro/Ro vessels for prepositioning and surge.
In June 1992, the Mission Need Statement for Strategic Sealift was approved. In
addition, the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) key ship characteristics was
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validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The Program Office,
PMS 385, was also established at this time.
Milestone I occurred on August 17, 1992. Following this on October 30, 1992, the
conversion engineering design contracts were awarded to 5 U.S. shipyards for $400,000
each. The new construction design contracts were awarded November 20, 1992 to 7 U.S.
shipyards, for $1.2 million each.
The conversion program proceeded concurrently with the newbuilding program.
The technical proposals were received for the conversion program on March 16, 1993.
The pricing proposals for the conversions were received on March 30, 1993. This is
when the discussions with the conversion offerors started. Detailed questions were sent
to the shipbuilders regarding the detail design and conversion award at the end of April.
The answers to these questions were due in late May. Milestone II meetings for the
conversions occurred in June of 1993. On 30 July of 1993 National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) was authorized to convert three ships, and Newport
News Shipbuilding (NNS) was authorized to convert two ships.
The new construction program followed the same pattern. Technical proposals
were submitted on May 20, 1993, and the pricing proposals were due on June 21,1993.
August 4, 1993 marked the Milestone II program decision meeting for the new
construction. September 2, 1993, Avondale Industries, Inc. (AII) was authorized to
construct one ship with options for five additional ships. On September 15, 1993
NASSCO was authorized to construct one ship also, with the options for five others.
The major events of the program are illustrated on the timeline in Figure 3.
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4.2 Unique Features of the Sealift Program
The Sealift Program had some very unique features to it. The function of the
government in this program shifted from being one of design to one of essentially review
and contractual functions. In addition, the design of this program occurred very quickly
by government standards.
The most obvious difference between this program and most of the other Navy ship
acquisition programs was the role of the shipyards. In most previous programs, the Navy
did the feasibility studies, preliminary design and contract design in-house, with the
support of design agents. The Sealift program involved the shipyards to do this work.
Shortly after Milestone 0 the shipyards that responded to the RFP were contracted to
perform the initial design studies. This means that industry comes up with the different
designs that will satisfy the requirements that the government has set. The governments'
role in design for this model is greatly reduced, with the bulk of the work being shifted to
a design review function.
The other main difference between this program and other Navy ship acquisition
programs is evident in the reduced cycle time for design. It was stated previously that a
generic ship acquisition program usually takes between 3 and 18 months to complete
feasibility studies. It can be seen that this program took approximately 12 months to
complete this stage, from Milestone 0 to Milestone I. The preliminary design of a typical
Navy ship acquisition program takes anywhere from 6 to 12 months. Contract Design
generally consumes 9 to 15 months. So a typical program might take between 15 and 27
months to complete preliminary and contract design. These represent the events that take
place between Milestone 1 and Milestone II. The Strategic Sealift program used 10
months to complete these activities for the conversion project, and 12 months for the
newbuildings. Table 1 compares these time differences.
Table 1.4
Design Stage Generic Ship Strategic Sealift Program
Conversions New Construction
Feasibility Studies 3-18 months 12 months 12 months
Preliminary and 15-27 months 10 months 12 months
Contract Design
Total 18-45 months 22 months 24 months
4.3 Development Costs of the Sealift Program
The total design costs through Milestone II for the Strategic Sealift Program were
$44.9 million. The total Sealift Program costs amount to approximately $5.9 billion.
Obviously, the design is a small factor of those costs, approximately 0.8%. Figures 4 and
5 show the scope of these costs.
Figure 6 is an approximation of the timing of the design costs. Many of the funds
that are appropriated can be spent in a multi-year period. It is difficult to tell which year
these funds were actually spent, but Figure 6 is one estimate of the timing. You can see
there is fairly significant funding in the first year, which then drops off some. The first
year includes funding for the conceptual designs, feasibility studies, etc. After that stage,
4 Improving the Ship Design, Acquisition, and Construction Process: Strategic Plan, Vol. 1, page 2-6 - 2-7
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the spending drops off, and generally builds towards Milestone II. The engineering
designs took place almost exclusively in FY 1993, which is reflected in Figure 6.
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Of the design costs, Figure 7 shows that the government incurred 37% of the costs,
while 63% were associated with private industry. The costs included in the government
portion of that cost include the Program Office, the Design Office, and OGA. The
industry segment included contractors that supported the program management and
design effort, shipyards, and regulatory bodies.
It becomes apparent in Figure 7 that the majority of the design costs in the program
were in industry. Figures 8 and 9 show the breakdown of costs for the various players in
the Strategic Sealift design. These diagrams indicate the significance that industry had in
the design of the Strategic Sealift program. The Program Office and the Design Office
within the Navy made up only 11% of the total design costs, that were $44.9 million.
The remainder cost of the design without these two players was $39.9 million. The
majority of costs associated within the government came from OGA, which was
constituted primarily of the cost of David Taylor Research Center (DTRC).
Figure 10 and 11 illustrates the cost of each of the steps of design. Obviously, the
bulk of the design cost is associated with the contract design phase. Relatively little
money is spent in the concept and feasibility design phase; only 6%. The preliminary
design phase represents approximately 1/3 of the total design cost.
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4.3.1 Concept and Feasibility Design Costs
The concept and feasibility design phase of the program cost approximately $2.6
million. This is approximately 6% of the total design cost of $44.9 million. Figures 12
and 13 show the breakdown of costs within concept and feasibility design. The outside
contractors spent the largest amounts of funds in this phase. Design firms constituted
44% of the costs of this design phase. The government costs were approximately 35% of
the design. Obviously, the total costs of this design phase are relatively insignificant in
comparison to the total design effort, and particularly with respect to the entire
acquisition program.
4.3.2 Preliminary Design Costs
The preliminary design phase of the program cost approximately $15.6 million.
This is approximately 35% of the total design cost. The cost allocation of this design
phase is shown in Figures 14 and 15. The government had a larger role in this phase
compared with the concept and feasibility stage; approximately 48% of the costs of this
phase were associated with government organizations. The U.S. shipyards were not
involved in the concept and feasibility studies but did become involved in preliminary
design, with contracts worth $2.25 million, or approximately 14% of the costs of this
phase. As in the concept and feasibility design stage, the design firms were allocated the
largest piece of the pie, at 35%.
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4.3.3 Contract Design Costs
The contract design phase of the program cost over $26.7 million, or roughly 59%
of the total design cost. Figures 16 and 17 show the breakdown of this design phase. The
program office and design office had relatively small roles in this phase, at approximately
4% and 3%, respectively. OGA, however, consumed almost $6.4 million, or 24% of this
phase. Shipyards did the largest proportion of work, with over $10 million dollars and
39% of the costs associated with this phase. The role of the design firms was diminished,
at 15% of the costs, or approximately $4.1 million.
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5 Role of Government Review s
5.1 Function of Government Review
The main objectives of the government in the design reviews of the Strategic Sealift
program are the following:
* To assure that all the technical requirements are understood by the shipyards
(and the government).
* To assist the shipyards in developing their technically acceptable design
* To facilitate dialogue with the shipyards as much as possible.
* To authorize detail design and construction (DD&C) options as quickly as possible
To ensure that the objectives were met, the Government Design Team adopted the
following philosophy:
* To be flexible
* The goal is to have all designs technically acceptable and meeting the COR by the
end of Engineering Design.
* To support and facilitate the shipyard design effort
* Communication with the each shipyard is to be free and open. Shipyard
communications are proprietary between the shipyard and the government. COR
changes are general and will not depict specific shipyard generated design solutions.
* To be open and agreeable to new, different or better ideas.
5 Much of the content and wording of this section was taken from an unpublished paper on "Strategic
Sealift Ship Engineering Design, Design Review Process and Quality Assurance Program," by Ron Nix
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* No technical leveling will occur. The government will not give preferences,
solutions, or ways to improve the design. If the design meets the COR, it is
acceptable. If it does not meet the COR, the government will advise the shipyard of
its concern.
5.2 Government Review in the Strategic Sealift Program
The Strategic Sealift program used the shipyards to develop the designs starting
with the concept designs. This meant that the government's main role in the
development of this design was its review function. Concept designs for the Sealift
program were also referred to as initial designs.
The Navy gave 9 U.S. shipyards contracts for development of concept designs.
Each shipyard had two face-to-face design reviews with the government.
The conversion engineering design contracts were awarded to 5 U.S. shipyards.
These designs were reviewed face-to-face twice during the design process, in addition to
one final government-only submittal review, for a total of three reviews. These were
schedule driven reviews, approximately 6 weeks apart. The schedule for the reviews was
identified in the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL). The Navy received the
deliverables 10 workdays before the formal review. Before the final review, the Navy
Design team would do the following activities:
* Sort through the designs
* Attach the necessary forms
* Distribute the designs to the appropriate personnel
* Actually perform the review
* Format a package
* Make the necessary copies
Each formal review took approximately one day.
The new building design contracts were awarded to 7 U.S. shipyards. These
designs followed essentially the same process, except they were reviewed face-to-face
one additional time, for a total of four design reviews. As stated before, these reviews
were for engineering compliance with the requirements, and were not ranked. The final
submittal was then subject to the source selection process. This is where the designs
were ranked for down selection.
The total number of design reviews for this program before Milestone II was 61.
This includes 18 reviews in the concept design stage, 15 for the conversion designs, and
28 for the new construction designs. The government never stopped reviewing once the
process started. The Navy Design office and design agents had a core of approximately
40 people associated with this task, and a peak of about 70 people.
The reviews were similar for both the initial and engineering designs; however,
there were some changes. The reviews for both design stages included the following
characteristics:
* They were formal reviews (required by contract)
* They were schedule driven reviews
* They were primarily technical reviews
* Design deliverables were required 10 work-days before the design review
* The reviews addressed the status of the design process
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e The reviews were not linked to a formal acquisition milestone
The design reviews in the initial design phase gave the government invaluable experience
with the review process. Some changes were made to the review process from this
experience, and also because of the projected workload of 43 reviews in the engineering
design phase. Some of these changes are reflected in Table 2.
Table 2. Design Review Changes
Design Review Aspect Initial Design Engineering Design
Business Sensitivity Each design review was Same, except for the
confidential between the Program Office Q&A's
government and shipyard.
Formality Tended toward formal Tended towards less formal
presentations by the presentations.
shipyards
Length 4 Hours Entire day, or until shipyard
felt satisfied
Depth of Review Relatively top level Relatively detailed
Review Feedback Oral Only Oral and written design
review comments, in
addition to Q&A's
End Product Use Study phase, used as input Design competition where a
to Engineering Design selected number of
requirements and concept contracts would be
development authorized for
conversion/construction
Three formal communication vehicles were used during the design reviews. They
were Design Reviews, Q&A's, and specification reviews. To facilitate the three
communication vehicles, the Government Design Team established five key product
lines:
* Design Reviews
* Design Review Notebooks
* Specification Review Notebooks
* Q&A's
* COR Modifications
Each of these product lines is discussed in the following sections.
5.2.1 Design Reviews
The contract design review schedule was every four to six weeks. The exact dates
were defined between the shipyards and the government as the project proceeded. The
reviews on the New Construction and Conversion Engineering Design Contracts were
scheduled to be 180 degrees out of phase with each other. Within each series of contracts
(new construction or conversion) all the design reviews were back-to-back.
The general content of the reviews was established in the contract statement of
work (SOW). Each shipyard chose their own style of presentation and the material that
they wanted to address. The shipyards developed their own schedule for the reviews, and
submitted it to the government. In some cases, the government would add items to the
agenda.
The government personnel attending the reviews were essentially the same at
each review to maintain consistency. The core consisted of nine people from both the
Program Office and the Design Office. Other guests were invited, including Army and
Navy Sponsor representatives. The government did not have any support contractors at
the design reviews. They did attend detailed session meetings when required to
supplement the core government review team. The shipyards sent varying amounts of
personnel depending on preference and the amount of work contracted out to design
agents.
After the first design review where the government review team was working out
of design review notebooks, the shipyard made it clear that they wanted copies of these
notebooks. The government was under no contractual obligation to provide them with
comments, but the Program Office decided to provide the review sheets out of the design
review notebooks. The benefit was the following:
* It documented the design review in detail. Any government concerns
were identified.
* It provided the shipyards documented feedback that they could share with
their team.
* It provided the government with a documented performance measure from
review to review. Repeat comments indicated a need to resolve design
issues.
The main risk associated with providing the review sheets was allowing any
inappropriate comments to slip through to the shipyard. An example would be comments
that are directing change, or comments that may be inaccurate, out of scope, etc. This
was a problem because the review sheets were turned over to the shipyard at the
conclusion of the design review. Due to the fast-paced nature of this project, there was
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not time to carefully censor every sheet, with the review sheets still retaining their
meaningfulness. The review sheets were the only part of the Design Review Notebooks
that were given to the shipyards.
5.2.2 Design Review Notebooks
The design review notebook was a three-ring notebook divided into the following
sections:
* Executive Summary
* Q&A's
* Data Delivery Status
* Regulatory Body Correspondence
* Shipyard Agenda
* Review Sheets
* Recommended changes to the COR
5.2.2.1 Executive Summary
The executive summary condensed the status of the design to a document that
could be read and understood in minutes. It also summarized the governments concerns
that were addressed further in the Design Review. The executive summary was the one
integrated assessment of the review which did not occur elsewhere. The executive
summary was divided into three parts; the synopsis, the standard presentation, and a
Military Traffic Management Command - Transportation Engineering Agency (MTMC-
TEA) Computer Aided Deployment Embarkation System (CODES) cargo loadout
summary.
The synopsis was approximately three pages, and consisted of an administrative
header, a textual synopsis of the design, and questions for the shipyard. The synopsis
was an assessment of the ship design against key system level requirements. This was
organized by systems, not CDRL numbers. The synopsis was an excellent integration
tool for the Government Design Team. Inconsistencies in the design and review sheets
could be uncovered when preparing the synopsis. The questions for the shipyard were
questions that were not obvious from the synopsis or the review sheets that needed to be
emphasized. Oftentimes, no questions were listed. The synopsis was not provided
outside the Government Design or Management Teams.
The standard presentation was an effort by the government to present the designs
in a uniform and consistent manner. During the engineering design phase, the
government had to keep track of 13 shipyard Sealift designs (one shipyard carried a sister
ship as a separate design), all of which were being developed simultaneously. The
shipyards each developed their own style of presentation, so the standard presentation
provided homogeneity and consistency. This also helped to integrate the designs, and
was effective to present to Government personnel not involved with the daily review
process.
The CODES loadout primarily provided an independent viewpoint on the ships
ability to carry the design cargo loads.
5.2.2.2 Q&A's
This section consisted of printouts of the Q&A's from both the Shipyard Q&A's
and the PMS Q&A's. This was done for referral purposes during the design review, as
well as to catch any discrepancies between the status of government and shipyard
Q&A's.
5.2.2.3 Data Delivery Status
This was a printout of the CDRL Management Center (CMC) database. The
CMC is a PMS 385 contractor where all headquarters data is sent. The CMC then
distributes the appropriate documents to headquarters reviewers. The printout of the
database was a way to access the status of a document during the Design Review.
5.2.2.4 Regulatory Body Correspondence
The Sealift ships are military ships designed to meet military requirements using
commercial specifications and standards. As a result, ABS, USCG, and the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations were used extensively. These organizations, ABS and
USCG, perform interpretation and application of these regulations. Any correspondence
with these groups such as clarifications and approvals were included in this section.
5.2.2.5 Shipyard Agenda
This was simply a copy of what the shipyard intended to cover during the review.
It was useful to have this information to prepare for the review.
5.2.2.6 Review Sheets
This section was the core of the Design Review. The review sheets are also
known as checklists. The review sheets were prepared before the Engineering Design
Phase, and incorporated different elements from various Navy acquisition programs.
Each drawing and calculation CDRL item required under the contract had a
review sheet. Each review sheet had four parts; an Administrative Header, an Interface
Check, Questions to Consider, and Comments. The Administrative Header contained the
CDRL number and title, the submission number, date, shipyard name, and conversion or
new construction information. The Interface check listed other CDRLs that interfaced
with the particular CDRL under review. Three possible answers were provided for on the
form; yes, no, or not applicable. If an interface was marked no, it was required to have a
comment later on the review sheet.
The questions to consider part was formatted similarly to the interface check. The
questions to consider were based on the COR, CDRL requirements, regulatory
requirements, and the SOW. The comments were divided into three categories, basically
according to severity. The most severe included undeniable failures of the shipyard to
meet contract requirements, etc. The least severe could include the reviewers opinion, or
mention of something that the reviewer considered as a marginal solution, but is within
the contract.
5.2.2.7 Recommended Changes to the COR
This portion of the notebook summarized the recommended changes to the COR
by the shipyards. It included a section for each recommendation for adjudication and
justification.
Exhibit 1 is an example of a design review sheet. This review sheet is for CDRL
number A005, which corresponds to Model Test Documentation.
Current Date: 6/15/95
CDRL No.: A005 TITLE:
SHIPYARD:
Model Test Documentation
NEW CONSTRUCTION
Category:
1. COR deficiencies (include a reference to applicable COR
Section):
2. Technical problems and/or unfulfilled CDRL requirements:
3. Other items (include general discussion):
This review sheet addresses the content of the model test
report. The ability of the ship to meet spend requirements is
addressed in CDRL A014.
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Current Date: 6/15/95
CDRL No.: A005 TITLE: Model Test Documentation
SHIPYARD: NEW CONSTRUCTION
Questions to consider:
Yes No NA Cat
10. Referring to 10.2.7, are predictions in
accordance with the specified expansion
methodology (using ITTC 78, CA per DDS051,
etc.) presented in the report for at least
bare hull resistance, appended hull resistance,
self-propulsion with stock propellers, and
self-propulsion with design propellers, all
for the ship in the Full Load Departure
Condition?
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Current Datet 6/15/95
CDRL No.: A005 TITLE:
SHIPYARD:
Model Test Documentation
NEW CONSTRUCTION
Questions to consider:
(n) Cavitation performance of design
propeller simulating ship at speed
corresponding to 100 percent MCR, in
Full Load Condition.
(o) Cavitation experiment of Design
propeller simulating ship at one speed
with no cavitation, in Full Load
Condition.
8. Referring to 10.2.6, 10.2.7, and 10.2.8 of
CDRL A002, are the following items included
in the test report(s)?
(a) Wake harmonic analysis results?
(b) Cavitation characteristics
(photographs, sketches, verbal
description) of design propeller,
simulating ship at 24 knots, in Full
Load condition?
(c) Cavitation characteristics (photographs,
sketches, verbal description) of Design
propeller, simulating ship at 24 knots,
in Ballast condition.
(d) Cavitation characteristics (photographs,
sketches, verbal description) of Design
propeller, simulating ship at speed
corresponding to 100 percent MCR, in
Full Load condition.
(e) Cavitation characteristics (photographs,
sketches, verbal description) of Design
propeller, simulating ship at speed
corresponding to 100 percent MCR, in
Ballast condition.
9. Does the test report include descriptions of
the models, test procedures and techniques,
and test set-ups?
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Current Date: 6/15/95
CDRL No.: A005 TITLE: Model Test Documentation
SHIPYARD: NEW CONSTRUCTION
Questions to consider:
Yes No NA Cat
(o) Bilge keel location/extent shown on
body plan?
(p) Definition of strut alignment angles,
estimated from tests?
(q) Photographs of propeller cavitation
model and test set up?
4. Is propeller direction of rotation noted
for all self-propulsion tests?
5. Are test data extrapolation methods
described?
6. Is tank water temperature recorded for
each test?
7. Referring to 10.2.6, 10.2.7 and 10.2.8 of
CDRL A002, are the required data (tabulated
and plotted), applicable to the full-scale
ship, presented in the report(s) for the
following tests?
(a) Bare hull resistance, Full Load.
(b) Bare hull resistance, Ballast.
(c) Appended hull resistance, Full Load.
(d) Appended hull resistance, Ballast.
(e) Appended hull resistance, Intermediate
Load.
(f) Self-propulsion, stock propellers,
Full Load.
(g) Self-propulsion, stock propellers,
Ballast.
(h) Self-propulsion, design propellers,
Full Load.
(i) Self-propulsion, design propellers,
Ballast.
(j) Self-propulsion, design propellers,
Intermediate Load.
(k) Wake survey.
(1) Open water, design propellers.
(m) Cavitation performance of design
propeller simulating ship at 24 knots,
in Full Load Condition.
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STRATEGIC SEALIFT SHIP ENGINEERING DESIGN REVIEW
Current Date: 6/15/95
CDRL No.:
1st 2nd
A005 TITLE:
3rd 4th SUBMISSION
Model Test Documentation
Category: 1. COR Deficiency
2. Technical Concern
3. Other
SHIPYARD: NEW CONSTRUCTION
Yes No NA Cat
Interface
Check:
Is the Model Test Data compatible
with:
1. Model Test Plan A002
2. Hull Lines and Molded Offset
Drawings A015-3
3. Resistance and Powering
Calculations A014
Questions to consider:
1. Are model scale and model propeller
dimensions acceptable?
2. Are the principal hull dimensions and
principal hull form parameter values,
applicable to each test condition as listed
in 10.2.6 of CDRL A002, included in the
test report(s)?
3. Do the test reports include:
(a) Body plan?
(b) Bow and stern profile lines drawings?
(c) Sectional area curve offsets?
(d) Section area curve plot?
(e) DWL curve offsets?
(f) DWL curve plot?
(g) Stock propeller physical
characteristics?
(h) Stock propeller drawing?
(i) Stock propeller open-water
characteristics?
(j) Design propeller physical
characteristics?
(k) Design propeller drawing?
(1) Sketch(es) of all appendages?
(m) Rake arrangement sketch?
(n) Photographic records applicable to
appendage alignment tests?
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5.2.3 Specification Review Notebook
Originally, the specifications and the drawings and calculations were to be
addressed at the same design review. Slips in the specification development and review
schedules did not permit this, however. Specification reviews had not been done at all in
the Initial Design Phase, so the scope of this task was difficult to estimate originally. The
specification reviews turned out to be quite time consuming. The specification review
notebook basically consisted of the review sheets in specification order. The review
sheets were created using the same systems as drawing and calculation review sheets.
5.2.4 Q&A's
One of the important lessons for the government from the Initial Design Phase
was the need for a system of Q&A's. The government team was not prepared to handle
specific questions during the reviews, and this was the best method to handle it. The
Q&A's were for technical matters only. The Q&A's would be private between the
shipyard and the program office; however, if in answering a question, a requirement was
clarified that could significantly affect technical development, strategy, or cost, the Q&A
would be shared with all the shipyards. The shared Q&A's were generic and did not
identify the shipyard or reveal their approach. There were approximately 500 formal
questions in the Engineering Design Phase.
5.2.5 COR Modifications
The conversion and new construction CORs were updated with modifications as
the program proceeded. The updates included positively adjudicated recommended
changes to the COR from the shipyards, implementing Q&A's, etc.
5.3 Effectiveness of Design Reviews
Most government personnel felt that this review process was effective in
managing the acquisition product. This process was structured to review a large amount
of information fairly and consistently. It is not a perfect system, though. The
government learned many valuable lessons along the way, which improved the process.
However, no statistics were kept to measure the quality of the process. Amount of
feedback and cycle time are two examples of metrics which could help to identify weak
areas in this process.
5.4 Role of Government Review in Future Navy Ship
Acquisition Programs
The Strategic Sealift program has generally been regarded as a successful one. This
then begs the question; is this a good model to follow? The fact remains that this is about
as close to a commercial ship as the Navy buys. On other programs which have more
combat systems, and are generally more complex, the government's role in the design
process will most likely be greater. Should the amount of design review increase,
decrease, or remain the same?
The amount of review that is required by government will depend on the amount of
design work that is done by contractors. In addition, the amount of design review will
depend on the complexity and performance requirements of the ship. The amount of
design review will increase the more complex and advanced that the ship is. One
possibility that could occur is that the design costs associated with a more complex ship
will necessarily increase, but the amount of design review will remain the same
percentage of the total design cost.
The Navy has clearly been moving towards having industry perform more of the
design work in ship acquisitions. One way to determine if the Strategic Sealift program
provides a good measure for this function is to see what happens in future programs, such
as the LPD-17 and DD-21.
6 Acquisition Stratezy Issues
There are several issues pertinent to acquisition strategy. These are discussed in the
following sections.
6.1 Extent of Navy Involvement in the Early Design Stages
One issue related to design is the extent that the Navy should be involved. The
early design stages are not a large proportion of the total ship acquisition cost; however,
these stages are crucial in determining the cost, schedule, and performance of the
delivered ship. By Milestone II, roughly 80 percent of the cost and performance of the
ship is locked in. Obviously, the work done at these stages is very important and has a
large impact on the success of the program.
The Strategic Sealift program did not use the Navy for a significant amount of early
design work. The concept design work was tasked to 9 different shipyards shortly after
Milestone 0. One disadvantage of this is that the government must support 9 different
design staffs rather than one. The advantage of this process is that each works
independently, and thus comes up with different solutions for the same requirements.
This brainstorming (and extra initial cost) in the early stages could ultimately save large
amounts of money in the long run if a better design is selected than one the government
would have selected. This competition in the early stages does provide incentive for the
shipbuilders to come up with innovative solutions. If the design is done by a single
government team, the design may not be the most innovative, or the lowest cost. In
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addition, the Navy as designer and ultimate operator may not have a great incentive to
reduce requirements.
The Sealift ships are not complicated ships. There are not any advanced combat
systems. While the Sealift program has generally regarded as successful, there have been
some reservations about using the same acquisition strategy for more complex ships.
With more complex ships, the shipyards may have a very difficult time deciding between
tradeoffs from an operational point of view. The Navy has a difficult time deciding what
it wants, so how will the shipyards do that for them? There is a feeling that this strategy
works if you are willing to accept what you get; however, this may not be what you were
expecting. One alternative would be to use the shipyards for the concept and preliminary
designs, at which point the Navy would select a design. The shipyards could then be
guided by the contracted ship specification.
One issue related to this is the extent of the government staff. In recent years the
government has concentrated on downsizing, so it is not clear whether the Navy will be
able to continue the high level of involvement. One could argue that since the
government has been doing the majority of the early design work for the past couple of
decades, they have been doing the U.S. yards a disservice in terms of staying competitive
in the commercial market by taking actions that result in reducing the experienced design
staff at the shipyard.
6.2 Extent of Navy Involvement in Combat System
Procurement and Integration
The Navy has been trying to determine whether ship systems are furnished by the
Government (GFE) or by the contractor (CFE). This issue can affect ship affordability
and acquisition incentives. Late arrivals or defects of GFE can lead to large claims
against the government. If the shipyard was to assume the risk of this equipment, they
could not sue the government for problems. The flip side, however, is that if the same
combat system can be used on several classes of ship the government can usually acquire
combat systems at lower cost than the shipbuilder can. This was the case in the Strategic
Sealift program where the different classes of ships built at different yards shared the
same stern ramps, cranes, etc. In addition, the government assumes the significant risks
associated with combat system performance.
6.3 Competition versus Early Down-Selection
The Navy has primarily been using competition in the acquisition process;
however, some of the other ways of cutting costs such as using IPTs, implementing build
strategy in the design, etc. may be compromised by this. The major benefit of
competition is lower prices, particularly if the shipyards believe they must compete to
win an award. Competition prevents shipyard monopolies, and therefore limits price
increases. Competition for design encourages innovative and effective design. One way
this has been implemented in the past is through dual sourcing. This consists of awarding
one class of ship to two separate shipyards. The contracts can consist of several options
to buy more ships, and the government can choose whether to exercise these options or
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not. This results in lower prices, and the shipyards do their best so that the government
exercises the options on the follow ships. Another advantage of dual sourcing is that it
increases the surge potential for shipbuilding in the U.S., both for current and future
programs.
The major disadvantage of full competition is that it makes early industry
involvement in the IPT process more difficult. The optimum way to use these teams
would be to involve the industry members at the earliest possible stage. If there are
multiple yards involved in the acquisition process, there will need to be separate IPTs for
each yard. One solution to this is to have early down-selection of the shipyard for the
ship acquisition. It would still be possible to compete on sub-systems, and the prime
contractor can participate in this process. In addition, the government avoids supporting
several overhead structures on one project, such as in dual sourcing. The major
impediment for early down selection is the escalation of costs for a given ship, from
contract price to delivered price. If the award is sole source, the contract is critical. The
government must be very careful how the contract is written. Different theories abound
for the effectiveness of various types of contracts. Some argue that incentive fee and
award fee contracts have the potential of being cost-effective.
6.4 Role of Concurrent Engineering, IPPD, and IPTs in Navy
Ship Acquisition
Concurrent engineering is intended to consider all aspects of the life cycle in the
early stages of the design process. The concept originated in industry, and has been used
by several U.S. manufacturers, particularly in the auto and film industries. Instead of
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designing the product, and sending that to manufacturing to deal with it, concurrent
engineering proposed considering manufacturing in the design process. Involving the
manufacturers in the design process does this. This has now expanded to include many
other players besides manufacturers in the process. One definition of current engineering
is:
Concurrent Engineering is a systematic approach to the integrated development of
a product and its relatedprocesses, that emphasizes responsiveness to customer
expectations and embodies team values of cooperation, trust and sharing, in such a
manner that decision making proceeds with large intervals ofparallel working by
all its life cycle perspectives, synchronized by comparatively brief exchanges to
produce consensus.6
The Navy has involved the shipbuilders in the early design phases during the past
two decades. Concurrent engineering, however, goes beyond this level of involvement.
The operators, support personnel, combat and support systems developers, and suppliers
also should be involved to realize the benefits of a true systems engineering approach.
The goal of concurrent engineering is to "produce products that meet given function and
quality requirements in the shortest possible time and lowest cost." (Bennett and Lamb)
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) is a management process that
integrates all activities from product concept through production and field support, using
a multi-functional team, to simultaneously optimize the product and its manufacturing
and sustainment processes to meet cost and performance objectives. IPPD is defined as
"an expansion of concurrent engineering utilizing a systematic approach to the integrated,
concurrent development of a product and its associated manufacturing and sustainment
processes to satisfy customer needs." (Perry memo) The key tenets of IPPD are as
follows:
* Customer Focus - The primary objective of IPPD is to satisfy the
customer's needs better, faster, and at less cost. The customer's needs
should determine the nature of the product and its' associated process.
* Concurrent Development of Products and Processes - Processes should be
developed concurrently with the products that they support. It is critical
that the processes used to manage, develop, manufacture, verify, test,
deploy, operate, support, train people, and eventually dispose of the
product be considered during product development. Product and process
design and performance should be kept in balance.
* Early and Continuous Life Cycle Planning - Planning for a product and its
processes should begin early in the science & technology phase (especially
advanced development) and extend throughout a product's life cycle.
Early life cycle planning, which includes customers, functions and
suppliers, lays a solid foundation for the various phases of a product and
its processes. Key program events should be defined so that resources can
be applied and the impact of resource constraints can be better understood
and managed.
* Maximize Flexibility for Optimization and Use of Contractor Unique
Approaches - RFP's and contracts should provide maximum flexibility for
6 J. Bennett and T. Lamb, "Concurrent Engineering: Application and Implementation for U.S.
Shipbuilding," Journal of Ship Production, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1996
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optimization and use of contractor unique processes and commercial
specifications, standards and practices.
* Encourage Robust Design and Improved Process Capability - Encourage
use of advanced design and manufacturing techniques that promote
achieving quality through design, products with little sensitivity to
variations in the manufacturing process (robust design) and focus on
process capability and continuous improvement.
* Event-Driven Scheduling - A scheduling framework should be established
which relates program events to their associated accomplishments and
accomplishment criteria. An event is considered complete only when the
accomplishments associated with the event have been completed as
measured by the accomplishment criteria. This event-driven scheduling
reduces risk by ensuring that product and process maturity is
incrementally demonstrated prior to beginning follow-on activities.
* Multidisciplinary Teamwork - Multidisciplinary teamwork is essential to
the integrated and concurrent development of a product and its processes.
The right people at the right place at the right time are required to make
timely decisions. Team decisions should be based on the combined input
of the entire team (e.g. engineering, manufacturing, test logistics, financial
management, contracting personnel) to include customers and suppliers.
Each team member needs to understand his/her role and support the roles
of the other members, as well as understand the constraints under which
other team members operate. Communication within teams and between
teams should be open with team success emphasized and rewarded.
* Empowerment - Decisions should be driven to the lowest possible level
commensurate with risk. Resources should be allocated at levels
consistent with authority, responsibility, and resources to manage their
product and its risk commensurate with the team's capabilities. The team
should accept responsibility and be held accountable for the results of its
effort.
* Seamless Management Tools - A framework should be established which
relates products and processes at all levels to demonstrate dependency and
interrelationships. A single management system should be established that
relates requirements, planning, resource allocation, execution and program
tracking over the product's life cycle. This integrated approach helps
ensure teams have all available information thereby enhancing team
decision-making at all levels. Capabilities should be proved to share
technical and business information throughout the product life cycle
through the use of acquisition and support databases and software tools for
accessing, exchanging, and viewing information.
* Proactive Identification and Management of Risk - Critical cost, schedule
and technical parameters related to system characteristics should be
identified from risk analyses and user requirements. Technical and
business performance measurement plans, with appropriate metrics,
should be developed and compared to best-in-class industry benchmarks
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to provide continuing verification of the degree of anticipated achievement
of technical and business parameters.
The Integrated Product Team (IPT), also called the Integrated Product and Process
Development Team (IPPDT), is the implementing system for concurrent engineering and
IPPD. An IPT is a multi-disciplinary team that is involved in the design and production
process from the very beginning. The two most important characteristics of IPTs are the
following:
* Cooperation - Cooperation is essential. Teams must have full and open
discussions with no secrets. All the facts need to be on the table for each
team member to understand and assess. Each member brings a unique
expertise to the team that needs to be recognized by all. Because of that
expertise, each person's views are important in developing a successful
program, and these views need to be heard. Full and open discussion does
not mean that each view must be acted on by the team. The team is not
searching for "lowest common denominator" consensus. There can be
disagreement on how to approach a particular issue, but that disagreement
must be reasoned disagreement based on an alternative plan of action
rather than unyielding opposition. Issues that cannot be resolved by the
team must be identified early so that resolution can be achieved as quickly
as possible at the appropriate level.
* Empowerment - Empowerment is critical. The functional representatives
assigned to the IPT at all levels must be empowered by their leadership to
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give good advice and counsel to the Program Manager. They must be able
to speak for their superiors, the "principals," in the decision making
process. IPT members cannot be expected to have the breadth of
knowledge and experience of their leadership in all cases. However, they
are expected to be in frequent communication with their leadership, and
thus ensure that their advice to the Program Manager is sound and will not
be overturned later, barring unforeseen circumstances or new information.
One of the key responsibilities of the leadership is to train and educate
their people so they will have the required knowledge and skills to
represent their organizations' leaders. As IPT members, people are an
extension of their organizations and their leadership, and they must be able
to speak for those organizations and leaders.
The purpose of IPTs is to make team decisions based on timely input from the
entire team, including customers and suppliers. IPTs are generally formed at the Program
Manager level and may include members from both Government and the system
contractor. IPTs can be formed for ship design, contracting, and program management.
Oversight for current NAVSEA programs is now being conducted by an Overarching IPT
(OIPT). This function used to be done by the conventional milestone reviews.
The major challenge to implementing concurrent engineering is the change in
management structure. If no one in the shipyard has ever used concurrent engineering,
there will be no experience within the shipyard. Concurrent engineering is a change in
management philosophy. Many of the traditional managers will be opposed to this
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method because of a loss of control. Management is the key. If the actions and behavior
of management do not reinforce and support this change in philosophy, then any changes
will be ineffective.
Concurrent engineering is not used to a great extent in shipyards overseas.
Shipyards in the U.S., therefore, have been relatively unable to see the benefit of using
concurrent engineering. Thus far any pilot programs have been inconclusive in
demonstrating the perceived benefits of concurrent engineering. Without any examples
showing the benefits, the U.S. shipbuilders have a difficult time knowing whether this is
a good area to concentrate their efforts.
6.5 Most Effective Use of Acquisition Funding
One issue to consider is what the right allocation of funding is throughout the
acquisition process. Some people in the industry believe that if more money was spent in
the design stages, then much more money could be saved during the construction phases.
Often times some of the tradeoffs involved in the design of a Naval vessel are not
examined as thoroughly as they should be due to budget constraints. Designers will
prefer to design conservatively, and err on the cautious side. This can lead to extra
requirements or unnecessary equipment, and therefore added cost in the construction
phase.
One example of this issue is illustrated with the side port ramps on the Strategic
Sealift ships. Some who are familiar with the program feel that if more simulation work
had been done with the loading and unloading of the vessel, then the side port ramps
83
might have been eliminated. The reason more simulation work was not performed was
budgetary and time constraints. If more money had been spent on simulation and the side
port ramps were proved unnecessary, then much more money would have been saved by
not buying the associated equipment. However, it is very difficult to take a piece of
equipment out that that the customer has its mind set on; for instance, the U.S. Army with
the side port ramps.
Another example that illustrates this point deals with the regulations imposed by
the Coast Guard. If more money had been spent up front on the design, and
communication with the Coast Guard had been better, perhaps some of the design
changes later imposed may have been reduced. One particular aspect of the design that
comes to mind is the fire-fighting system, which resulted in large design changes
relatively late in the acquisition process. More money spent early in the design might
have resulted in fewer design changes. In the Strategic Sealift program, design changes
amounted to as high as 10% of the total cost of the ship. The budget for the conversion
program was 10% for the lead ship, and 5% for the follow ships, while the budget for the
new construction was 5% for the lead ship, and 3% for the follow ships. Figure 18 shows
design changes are estimated to account for 5.5% of the total cost of the entire program.
Figure 19 shows that the money spent on change orders accounted for approximately 7
times the amount of money spent on design through Milestone II. A huge portion of the
costs are locked in by the time Milestone II occurs. Therefore, if a better, more complete
design could be completed before Milestone II, possibly a large amount of savings may
occur. Another way to understand this is the following: if double the amount of money
was spent to obtain a better design before Milestone II, they would have needed to save
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approximately 14% of the change order cost for the program. Anything that they saved
beyond that would be savings to the Navy and the taxpayers of the U.S.
However, the numbers are somewhat deceiving in this case. Because of the time
pressures involved, the Navy began contracting for the standard equipment (e.g. ramps,
etc.) before the design was complete. Later design work was included under the "Change
Order" category. Therefore in this case the amount of money under the "change orders"
is overstatement while "Design" may be understated.
Another word of caution is necessary at this point. It is too simplistic to think that
more money spent up front by the government will always produce more savings later on.
Money alone will not produce these results without the appropriate time to spend it and
the needed cooperation among the parties involved.
Time is oftentimes more important than design maturity. In this project, the
design happened so fast that the reviewers had a difficult time digesting all the designs.
If they could have spent a little more time reviewing the designs without the potential
dangers of personnel burn out, it is possible that the money would have been spent more
effectively. The schedule of this design program did not permit that.
In addition, in many of these designs, the shipyard spent more to develop the design
than the government funded them for. They did this in hopes of winning the contract and
making the money back during the construction. It is the author's point of view that this
is not a good practice to continue. If the government does not give enough money for a
good design, then the only shipyards that will develop a good design are those that
believe they are going to win the contract. The others will put in less effort, and the
government will not get anything worthwhile out of them. The actual competition, and
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all the benefits that go along with that, will be gone. The government should fund what it
believes is necessary to develop a solid design. Perhaps one way to do this is to
determine what they traditionally spent on a design, and use that figure.
The major obstacle for spending more money up front on the design appears to be
budgetary process itself. It is easier to get money in Congress to buy a physical structure
such as a ship, compared to spending money on design. Many people believe that you
could save money later on in the construction process by spending more on design, but
that is tough to prove to Congress. Another consideration with this is to consider the
program. The Strategic Sealift program was intended to be an essentially commercial-
type acquisition program. That is, use off-the-shelf technology and basically accept the
designs that come in. Most Naval ships are considerably more complex than the Sealift
ships, so maybe it will be easier to fund more money early in the design stages of a more
complex ship program.
In discussing Sealift program funding with current and past personnel, all agreed
the amount of money spent by the Navy before Milestone II should not have been less
than that utilized. There was a general feeling that another $10 million could have
effectively been used on such areas as simulation and contractor activities.
7 Conclusions
Most people familiar with the Strategic Sealift Program consider it to be a successful
acquisition program. This program used industry to develop the design to a greater
extent than any previous Navy program. The effect of this was to shift the government's
role in the acquisition from developing the design to a predominantly review function.
The government performed 61 reviews in the Sealift program. This is a major task,
and as such required between 40 and 70 full-time employees to perform this function.
Most government personnel feel this was the minimum amount of review that could be
done and still receive an acceptable product. There were several benefits to having this
many reviews, however. One major benefit of numerous reviews was the open dialogue
that resulted from the face-to-face meetings. This led to clarifications of requirements,
and hence a better design. While this review process was perceived to be good, there was
no data taken to prove this. Some metrics need to be defined and used to evaluate and
potentially improve the quality of the review process.
The benefits of this type of acquisition program are many. First and foremost, are the
new and different ideas that arise out of independent design efforts. This competition can
lead to a better design than the government may have come up with. The number of
reviews that the government performed led to a sufficient amount of overview. The
result was a good product that meets their performance objectives and requirements.
Another benefit is that the shipyards begin to redevelop their engineering base for design,
which may have dwindled in the 1980's, when the shipyards were not designing
commercial vessels. Hopefully as the shipyards production processes improve, and their
design capabilities increase, the shipyards will be able to compete for commercial vessels
on a global level.
The design costs through Milestone II amounted to $44.9 million, or 0.8% of the total
costs of the program. Even if another $10 million were added to this total (as some think
would have been appropriate), this would only amount to 0.9% of the total costs. This is
a very small percentage that this paper examines. This program was intended to be as
"commercial" as possible. This resulted in minimizing the design costs in order to mimic
a commercial acquisition program. Navy ships, however, are significantly more complex
than a typical commercial ship. If the government had spent more on the design before
Milestone II, when 80% of the costs are already locked in, then it is possible they would
have enjoyed greater savings during the construction phase. One area where possible
savings could occur are the design changes. Perhaps some of these changes could have
been eliminated with more funding and time during design.
To judge whether this program is a good benchmark or not, will require comparison
to other modem Navy acquisition programs, such as the LPD-17, DD-21, and CVX.
These programs obviously have more combat systems, and are more complex. The true
effects of the changes in acquisition strategy will be felt in these programs, if they
continue to use a similar approach to the Sealift program. Hopefully these changes will
lead to a less expensive, more effective Navy.
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